and Kyrgyzstan. Neoconservatives, convinced that Russia and China were scheming to supplant the U.S. in Central Asia and undermine the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, redoubled calls for a unilateral, confrontational approach in the region. In the third phase, from 2009 onward, the Barack Obama administration first attempted to engage the SCO as part of a broader strategy to assist in its efforts to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, then reverted to a series of bilateral approaches toward the Central Asian states as the SCO's inability to deal with the 2010 turmoil in Kyrgyzstan confirmed its ineffectiveness.
C EN TRAL A SI A AND T HE SH ANGH AI GROUP
In the decade from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, American foreign policy struggled to find direction. 3 Walter Russell Mead describes this as ''a bipartisan age of narcissism and hubris,'' in which Americans believed their political and economic system had triumphed in a Fukuyama-style end of history. The U.S. was so dominant on the world stage that most Americans could not envision a serious challenge to their national security. 4 In foreign policy the Clinton administration pursued four broad goals: reducing the prospects for major war, securing and eliminating weapons of mass destruction inherited by the successor states of the Soviet Union, promoting a more open global economy, and encouraging the growth of democracy and human rights. 5 Each of these goals was reflected in policy toward Central Asia, though this took the form of bilateralism rather than engagement with the Shanghai Five as a group, which at this stage was not yet prepared to act collectively. 6 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. granted diplomatic recognition to the five newly independent states in Central Asia, and Congress enacted the Freedom Support Act of 1992, legislation that sought to bring American laws into line with the new geopolitical situation of 15 independent states. The Freedom Support Act encouraged creation of open markets; promoted the establishment of democracy and civil society; developed mechanisms to encourage trade, economic cooperation, and scholarly exchanges; and provided funds for nonproliferation and disarmament. The goal of this legislation was to enhance U.S. national security by preventing a return of the newly independent states to communism and, particularly in Central Asia, forestalling the emergence of religious extremism.
One of Washington's most important initial goals in Central Asia was to secure control of nuclear weapons and remove them from the region. These weapons consisted of bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, and over 1,000 warheads on strategic missiles located in Kazakhstan. Toward this end, Vice President Al Gore and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed the Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement in December 1993. During 1994-95 the warheads and bombers were sent to Russia for safekeeping, and the missile silos and launchers were subsequently destroyed. Kazakhstan's willingness to deal with this issue forthrightly and with dispatch earned the country profuse thanks from the U.S., and a promise of significant economic and diplomatic assistance.
American policy toward Central Asia and the Caucasus in the Clinton administration consisted of four dimensions: promoting democracy and civil society, supporting privatization and the creation of free market economies, resolving debilitating frozen conflicts such as those in the Caucasus, and integrating the small states of the region with the larger international community. Accessing the region's huge oil reserves was another priority for the U.S. Successful economic and political reforms were expected to contribute to stability and would benefit the broader region; failure could breed terrorism, religious and political extremism, and war. Regional integration would ensure that neo-imperial ambitions on the part of Russia (or other great powers) did not lead to a repeat of the 19th century Great Game, with the region's small states treated as pawns in the struggle for energy resources. 7 7. Strobe Talbott, ''A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia,'' address at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, July 21, 1997, American interests also dictated that nuclear materials and biological and chemical weapons left over from the Soviet era not fall into the hands of terrorists or hostile states. In 1994 the U.S. provided assistance to Kazakhstan to shut down the Aktau fast-breeder reactor, and established a joint commission consisting of five working groups covering trade, defense, nonproliferation, and other forms of cooperation. Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev visited the U.S. in December 1999 to co-chair the sixth session of the joint commission and meet with Clinton, an indication of the central importance Washington accorded this Central Asian nation.
The U.S. also attached considerable importance to its relationship with Uzbekistan, in population the largest of the five Central Asian states. Uzbekistan was active in NATO's Partnership for Peace program, and in 1999 the U.S. and Uzbekistan concluded agreements on military cooperation, antiterrorism, and dismantling a chemical weapons research facility. 8 While President Clinton himself did not visit Central Asia, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton traveled to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in November 1997, where she spoke on cultural diversity and women's rights. The close relationship established in the 1990s laid the foundation for U.S.-Uzbek cooperation in the war on terrorism following the September 11 attacks.
Key elements of U.S. policy toward the region were embodied in the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999, which supported the political and economic independence of the new states in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. This legislation prioritized resolving regional conflicts, developing trade and communications infrastructure, promoting human rights and democracy, and supporting U.S. business interests and investments in the region. Securing access to energy resources, containing terrorism, and preventing a reversion of the new states to communism were key goals on Capitol Hill, though few legislators evinced any real interest in the region. 9 -<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/970721talbott.html>. Ambassador-at-Large to the newly independent states Stephen Sestanovich reiterated these goals in his March 1999 testimony to Congress, adding that while progress on some of the goals (democratic and economic reform, for example) was sporadic, the U.S. remained committed to continue its engagement with states in the region. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan's (IMU) bombings in 1999, 10 together with Chechen insurgency in Russia and Uighur discontent in China's Xinjiang region, heightened Washington's awareness of the security threats in Central Asia and contributed to the formal organization of the SCO in June 2001. Washington paid closer attention to regional terrorism following the IMU attacks; Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made her first visit to the region in April 2000, announcing a Central Asian Border Security Initiative and providing $3 million in security assistance to each of the five Central Asian states. Subsequently, the State Department put the IMU on its list of recognized terrorist organizations. Human rights organizations charged that Washington was following a contradictory policy of supporting authoritarian leaders in the region based on security concerns and a need for oil, while glossing over serious human rights abuses, an accusation that would later be directed against the George W. Bush administration. However, there was still little if any official attention paid to the new SCO as an actor in regional politics.
C EN TRAL A SI A: A MARGIN AL CON CERN
The George W. Bush administration came into office critical of Clinton's foreign policy, and advocated a distinct, Republican set of foreign policy priorities. However, the focus before the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon was not on the possible threat of extreme Islamic-inspired terrorism, nor did the ''arc of crisis'' region, with Central Asia at its heart, command much attention. Policy before September 11 largely followed the parameters that had been established in the Clinton years. There was some concern about the signing of the Russian-Chinese Friendship Treaty, and joint Sino-Russian opposition to the U.S. administration's plans for missile defense and NATO expansion. 11 Although the George W. Bush administration had reportedly requested observer status at the formative SCO meeting, SCO members did not act on the request, and creation of the organization in June generated no official reaction from Washington. 12 Indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin had his first encounter with Bush in Ljubljana the day after the Shanghai meeting, an encounter noteworthy for its warmth, if not substance. 13 As a presidential candidate, George W. Bush had dismissed the notion that America could aid other countries in nation-building and asserted that the U.S. should behave with humility on the world stage. His chief foreign policy consultant and soon to be National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice outlined a security agenda for the new Republican administration-deterrence and power projection in defense of America's interests, promoting free trade and economic growth, renewing ties with allies, developing comprehensive relationships with major powers such as Russia and China, and dealing decisively with the threats of rogue regimes and hostile powers that might develop weapons of mass destruction. 14 In the Bush administration's initial security assessment, Central Asia and Islamic extremism figured only marginally. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who represented the neoconservative agenda, shaped much of the administration's early thinking on international threats. Rumsfeld had chaired two major advisory panels in the 1990s, one of which warned against ballistic missile attack and proposed an expansive missile defense program, and the second of which predicted dire consequences that might result from a sneak attack against U.S. satellites in space. The most urgent threat stemmed from a small number of missiles in the hands of irresponsible rogue states, which could use them to intimidate the U.S. and others with weapons of mass destruction. 15 Since Central Asia's weapons of mass destruction had been disposed of, and Bush's advisors discounted the benefits of nation-building, the region appeared to rank low on the administration's list of priorities.
PARTNERS AGAINST TERRORISM
With the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, the attention of the Bush administration shifted toward the al-Qaeda network and states providing support to terrorists, most notably, Afghanistan. Post-Soviet Central Asia suddenly became a vital staging ground in the war on terror.
Following the attacks, the Central Asian states each indicated its willingness to share intelligence and allow the U.S. overflight rights in the impending campaign against the Taliban. Rumsfeld visited Tashkent in early October 2001 and concluded an agreement to station some 1,500 American troops at the Karshi Khanabad (K2) Airbase, in exchange for security guarantees for Uzbekistan. In December, the U.S. and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement giving the U.S. access to the Manas airfield just outside the capital, Bishkek. The Kazakh government agreed to overflight of American planes and transshipment of supplies, and let the U.S. use the Almaty airport on an emergency basis. Tajikistan likewise granted the U.S. military use of the Dushanbe airport for refueling. 16 The war on terror highlighted the shared interests of the U.S., Central Asia, Russia, and China, all of which faced threats to their national security from terrorist organizations influenced by radical Islam. Russia could more effectively claim that Chechen separatists were allied with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. China quickly noted the connections between al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Uighur separatists in Xinjiang. The primary gain for Central Asia's leaders was to strengthen their hand against Muslim fundamentalists, who constituted the most serious opposition to their authoritarian regimes. The governments of these countries correctly understood that a U.S. preoccupied with fighting terrorists and willing to enact a fairly draconian U.S.A. Patriot Act, would be less critical of human rights abuses by its allies.
The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) issued in September 2002 outlined a defense posture that pledged support for moderate and modern governments in the Muslim world; promised more skilled diplomacy to win the ''war of ideas''; and asserted U.S. goals of strengthening energy security by working with allies and partners to expand energy sources ''especially in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region.'' With Russia, the U.S. sought to build a strategic partnership on common interests and shared challenges, while continuing to bolster the independence and stability of states of the former Soviet Union. Likewise, with China, the NSS described U.S. intent to seek a constructive relationship, cooperating in confronting terrorism while pressing Beijing to be more open and to respect human rights. 17 During the first term of the Bush administration, policy toward the Central Asian region embodied contradictory elements linked to competing bureaucratic priorities. The Department of Defense under Donald Rumsfeld was focused on security concerns, primarily the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, while the State Department under Secretary Colin Powell emphasized democracy promotion over security interests. Despite the rhetoric on building democracy in Central Asia, funding for such projects declined during 2003-05. The Pentagon assumed a larger role in U.S. foreign policy making as the neoconservatives in the administration denigrated the role of diplomacy. The signal for authoritarian Central Asian regimes was that they would not be held to account for their repressive policies. 18 Since, as detailed above, the SCO members cooperated with the U.S. in the Afghan campaign, Washington had few reasons to be concerned about the group. Some conservative analysts had voiced warnings about the SCO early on, but their concerns seemed to have little impact. Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation portrayed the July 2001 Russian-Chinese friendship treaty as portending a major geopolitical transformation in Central Asia. Together with the formation of the SCO, this shift would position the two great powers to define the rules under which the U.S. and its allies would participate in the region. 19 combination with the Bush administration's doctrine of preemptive attack outlined in the 2002 NSS, convinced the SCO members that the U.S. was prepared routinely to violate other nations' sovereignty in its war against terrorism.
The Bush administration had requested sending observers to the SCO, but had been repeatedly turned down, making Washington more suspicious of the organization. The fact that Iran was admitted as an observer in 2005 (together with Pakistan and India; Mongolia had achieved observer status in 2004) strengthened the perception that the SCO was evolving into an anti-Western alliance. 23 It was also in 2005 that the SCO summit called for a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Central Asia. Meeting in Astana in July, the SCO members noted that although they supported the coalition campaign, the active military phase of anti-terror operations in Afghanistan was nearing completion, and therefore a withdrawal date should be set for troops stationed in SCO member states. 24 The SCO's call for the withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan and the bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, together with Uzbek President Islam Karimov's request that America evacuate the K-2 base within six months, raised alarm bells in Washington. President The U.S. government preferred a bilateral approach toward the SCO member states, with the objective of countering Russian and Chinese influence over the smaller Central Asian countries. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, on a trip to Bishkek in July 2005, asserted that the status of the Central Asian bases was a matter for bilateral negotiations with the host countries, and not a concern of the SCO. 26 The U.S. and Kyrgyzstan engaged in protracted negotiations about the status of the base over the next several months. Secretary of State Rice finalized an agreement in October, and Kyrgyzstan's new president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, asserted that any future decision on the withdrawal of American forces would be a matter of negotiations between the two countries. 27 Washington subsequently agreed to a substantial increase in the rent it was paying for Manas. The SCO's declaration did not succeed in closing the base, but it did give Bishkek additional leverage to extract greater financial support from the U.S.
Congress quickly inserted itself into the equation. In July 2005, the House of Representatives passed an amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act expressing concern about the SCO's declaration on withdrawal of foreign forces. It called on the president and the secretaries of State and Defense to open a dialogue with the SCO countries regarding bases in the region. 28 Cooperation in Europe organized hearings to determine if the SCO was undermining American interests in Central Asia. The Commission's chairman, Senator Sam Brownback, noted that the member states of the SCO had demonstrated a commitment to assisting the U.S. in the war on terror, but voiced his concerns about the SCO impeding democratization in Central Asia and the suspicion that an underlying goal was to weaken American influence in the region. Senator Brownback noted that all the Central Asian states were also members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and had signed on to its democratic and human rights commitments. By contrast, the SCO's principle of absolute sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs appeared to contravene OSCE provisions. 29 In the 2006 Silk Road Strategy Act, Congress urged ''the continuation and expansion of a strategic dialogue with Russia and China, including U.S. participation as an observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for the purpose of promoting stability and security in the region.'' 30 From the Bush administration's perspective, the SCO facilitated Chinese and Russian influence in Central Asian regional affairs, readily sanctioned flawed elections, and conferred legitimacy on these authoritarian governments. In other words, the SCO insulated officials from external criticism and objective scrutiny, thus maintaining fragile and potentially unsustainable regimes. Washington's position was that real stability could only be achieved through democratic change; Russia, China, and the Central Asians, by contrast, trusted more in authoritarian stability. China's search for oil and raw materials led Beijing to uncritically support undemocratic and repressive regimes in Central Asia. Washington did not view the SCO as a helpful regional organization, preferring instead to work with individual countries, NATO, the OSCE, the EU, or Japan. Nor did the U.S. see Iranian participation in the SCO as productive. 31 To the extent that it was perceived as a potential counterbalance to NATO and the OSCE in Central Asia, the SCO was a problem for Washington. Russian-Chinese/SCO military exercises conducted in 2005 (off the Chinese preferable to preserving its traditional role as a buffer between empires, the fate to which it was consigned during the 19th century Great Game. 34 Reflecting this perspective, the 2006 NSS (1) advocated restoring Afghanistan's ''historic role'' as a land bridge between South and Central Asia (a region of ''great strategic importance''), (2) referred to Central Asia (the five post-Soviet states) as an enduring priority in American security, and (3) stressed the progress that had been achieved with India (though not at the expense of relations with Pakistan). 35 Toward the end of the Bush administration, it became clear that the SCO's 2005 call for a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces in Central Asia was not being followed up. 36 The deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan and the potential for greater instability should U.S. troops withdraw was probably one contributing factor. China has sought to retain its dominant position within the SCO, and appreciates the organization's potential to constrain U.S. influence in the region. Chinese leaders use the SCO as a forum to signal their international positions, as they did in welcoming Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad to the 2012 Beijing summit, and in condemning Washington's unilateral actions against Syria and Iran. Yet, the Chinese leaders remain wary of transforming the SCO into an anti-Western body. 37 The two larger members-Russia and China-have frequently been at odds over expanding SCO membership and the organization's primary functions, and these differences have been sufficient to prevent the SCO from evolving into either an integrated economic group or a military organization capable of challenging NATO. 38 In turn, the smaller Central Asian states regularly play off the great powers against each other, and have been reluctant to weaken ties with the U.S. 39 By the final years of the Bush administration, the specter of the SCO evolving into a powerful multilateral institution opposed to U.S. interests in Central Asia had essentially been laid to rest.
LIMI TED ENGAG EMENT
When Barack Obama assumed the presidency in 2009, the U.S. was overstretched by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and was facing a debilitating economic recession at home. The new president's initial approach in foreign policy was in many ways a reaction against the Bush policy of unilateralism, democracy promotion, and excessive reliance on force; it was what one observer called a ''grand redefinition'' of U.S. foreign policy. 40 President Obama assumed office on a foreign policy platform oriented toward pragmatic, constructive engagement, with an emphasis on diplomacy over the use of force and the promise of working through multilateral institutions in place of unilateralism. 41 Far less ideological than his predecessor, Obama's strategy of reaching out to such potential adversaries as Russia, China, and Iran aligned nicely with Charles Kupchan's argument that engagement is more productive than confrontation in resolving longstanding rivalries. 42 Engaging authoritarian states such as those in Central Asia enhanced U.S. security interests, but seemingly at the expense of democracy promotion efforts.
38. As former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Evan Feigenbaum noted, the SCO is problematic for Washington to deal with as an organization, since the SCO members themselves do not have a clear concept of whether they want the SCO to be a security group, trade bloc, or a mutually supportive association of authoritarian states. ''The SCO Role in Afghanistan,'' interview with Evan A. Feigenbaum, Council on Foreign Relations, March 26, 2009, at <http://www.cfr.org/publication/18944/sco_role_in_afghanistan.html>, accessed November 16, 2010.
39. For example, although U.S. forces had left Uzbekistan, German forces remained at Termez, in exchange for generous compensation. Kyrgyzstan permitted the U.S. to continue to use Manas following negotiations that dramatically raised compensation for use of the base. Engaging Central Asia, Russia, and China has been vitally important to the Obama administration's strategy in Afghanistan. This policy involves continuing the ''greater Central Asia'' concept adopted on Rice's watch and encouraging a constructive role for Moscow and Beijing in the region. Russia and the Central Asian states proved critical to delivering supplies to the troops in Afghanistan via the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), the commercially based alternate route for transporting non-lethal supplies from the Baltic ports through Russia and Central Asia to Afghanistan, as the links through Pakistan became problematic. 43 Beijing was approached about providing additional supply routes but remained wary of cooperating with Washington. Bilateral American ties with all five Central Asian states were formalized in December 2009 with the creation of the Annual Bilateral Consultations process, and Washington expressed interest in participating actively in such organizations as the SCO. 44 The Obama administration followed through on its pledge to engage regional organizations by sending Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Patrick Moon to a March 2009 SCO conference on Afghanistan in Moscow. This was the first time that senior officials from the U.S. and NATO had been invited to an SCO meeting (NATO Deputy Secretary-General Martin Howard was also present, along with representatives from a number of other major organizations, including the U.N.). Moon praised the joint action plan adopted by the SCO and Afghanistan at the conference as a positive step, discussed the narcotics problem there, and said the U.S. was looking to contribute to SCO efforts to stabilize the situation. Moon's presence was also intended to signal the new administration's willingness to extend an open hand to Iran, since the Iranians were in attendance as observers. 45 To be successful, the Obama administration's Central Asia policy required improving relations with and engaging the two larger members of the SCO, Russia and China. These two great powers, and to a lesser extent the Central Asian members, were needed to help the U.S. contain Iran's nuclear ambitions and stabilize Afghanistan. Given persistent attacks on supply convoys traversing the Pakistani routes, Russia and the Central Asian states became key components of the NDN. The NDN is considered vital in provisioning the additional troops deployed by the Obama administration's surge in Afghanistan. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates described the NDN as ''enormously helpful'' to the effort in Afghanistan, noting that as of September 2010 the alliance had sent some 20,000 containers through the network. 46 By early 2013 the great bulk of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) supplies continued to transit the more expensive northern route, even after Pakistan reopened the supply lines from the south. 47 This policy of engagement initially worked well in the ''reset'' effort with Russia under President Dmitri Medvedev, but relations have soured since Putin returned to the presidency; ties with China are complicated as well. By the second half of 2010, the Obama administration's ''open hand'' initiative to utilize the soft power of diplomacy in preference to the hard power of military force was being reevaluated, and a harder U.S. line could be detected toward rival states. This included China, which was deliberately snubbed by President Obama during his November 2010 Asia tour. Beijing had been less than accommodating on a range of issues, including currency valuation, treatment of Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, the South China Sea territorial dispute, and U.S. requests to transport troops and supplies for the Afghan campaign through the Wakhan Corridor. The Afghan government has urged China to open the border along the corridor and to build a road or rail line, but Beijing authorities have declined to act. 48 While presenting its foreign policy as something radically different, the Obama administration has in essence continued and intensified the late Bush-era policy of a comprehensive approach to Central Asia, with the goal of engaging the surrounding powers to develop the trade, energy, and transportation infrastructure of the region. In addition to providing vital transportation networks, the Central Asian states coordinate with Washington on anti-narcotics efforts, supply electricity to Afghanistan, and even (in the case of Kazakhstan) provide scholarships to Afghan students. 49 This broad and inclusive approach is deemed necessary to stabilize Afghanistan and to integrate that country into a new regional order following the planned ISAF withdrawal in 2014. However, Washington has utilized bilateral strategies with the relevant countries, rather than engaging the SCO as an organization. This is not so much an effort to undercut the SCO as it is an acknowledgement that the SCO as an organization has to date proved largely ineffective, and is hobbled internally by Sino-Russian competition.
Although China does not participate in the NDN, Washington had hoped to secure Beijing's cooperation in the form of additional supply routes, largely by rail. 50 The Obama administration has continued its predecessor's efforts to make China a ''responsible stakeholder'' in global affairs, and one key aspect of this is cooperation in stabilizing Afghanistan and greater Central Asia. China's interests in trade and developing Afghanistan's huge mineral resource base could be leveraged to realize the Obama administration's goal of reconstructing and developing Afghanistan. In addition, China has historically maintained close relations with Pakistan, which is indispensable in dealing with Afghanistan. Furthermore, the U.S. and China agree on the need to counter terrorism and narcotics trafficking in Central Asia. Yet, China appears more than willing to let the U.S and NATO shoulder the regional security burden, while anticipating long-term benefits from trade and investment in Afghanistan.
The SCO's inability, or unwillingness, to assume an active role in addressing the violent events of June 2010 in Kyrgyzstan, or those of July 2012 in the Gorno-Badakhshan region of Tajikistan, highlighted the organization's limitations. 51 The Tashkent summit in 2010 coincided with the riots in southern Kyrgyzstan, yet the members did no more than reaffirm the principles of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity; urge the speedy stabilization of the political situation; and express a willingness to provide Bishkek with the ''necessary support and assistance in solving this problem.'' 52 The SCO did send representatives to monitor the referendum for a new Kyrgyz constitution, along with the OSCE and Russian Central Elections Commission. 53 Given the timing of the riots, there was a strong suspicion that criminal forces had sparked the violence for their own purposes, and this may have played a role in the caution exhibited by the SCO. 54 The SCO's ineffectiveness and its internal rivalries have not been lost on Washington, which now largely ignores the organization. Still, the SCO has appeal for countries wary of U.S. unilateralism and suspicious of Western norms regarding humanitarian intervention. Although the organization has been described as a club of authoritarians, even democracies like India and Mongolia appreciate the ''Shanghai spirit'' of respect for territorial integrity, observing the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs, and respect for state sovereignty. This perspective may explain Turkey's successful bid for SCO dialogue partner status (approved at the 2012 Beijing SCO summit), and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's subsequent remarks that his country might drop its bid for EU membership in favor of joining the SCO. 55 -C ONC LU SI ON While the SCO members remain wary of America's presence in greater Central Asia, the prospect of a U.S. withdrawal may be equally troubling. Neither Russia nor China appears willing to assume the costs of policing the region, nor does the SCO have the capability or will to exercise its professed functions of guaranteeing security and preventing terrorism. The recent uptick in terrorist incidents within the Central Asian states and continued Taliban strikes in Afghanistan reinforce the conviction that the American project in Afghanistan is a failure. Uprisings similar to those in the Middle East are entirely possible, and may provide entrée for extremist elements linked to the IMU and al-Qaeda. Repeated Uighur-Han clashes in China's Xinjiang Province-in 1990, 2009, and, most recently, April 2013-ensure Beijing's continuing interest in securitizing the region. 56 In this context, an invigorated SCO may serve the interests of all major actors, including Washington, though with human rights and democracy likely to be sacrificed on the altar of security.
American foreign policy toward Central Asia and the SCO has fluctuated from indifference to hostility to cooperation and limited engagement, depending on the international context and the vagaries of U.S. domestic politics. The Obama administration came into office prepared to cooperate with multilateral organizations like it, and extended an open hand to the large and medium powers of the region. While Russia and the Central Asian states have been generally supportive of a temporary American presence in Afghanistan and the Central Asian region, as demonstrated by their cooperation on the NDN, China has been less accommodative. Beijing has refused to become militarily involved in Afghanistan and does not allow Washington to use its territory for transporting materiel. From China's perspective, an active role for the SCO in Afghanistan is preferable to NATO and U.S. involvement. 57 By 2010 the Obama administration realized that engagement with the SCO had its limits, and reverted to a bilateral approach to the region similar to that pursued by the previous administration.
The Obama White House has faced a dilemma in Central Asia similar to that of the George W. Bush administration. The U.S. needs to strike a balance among its efforts at democracy promotion, its energy and economic interests, and its security objectives in the region, but has had great difficulty doing so. None of the SCO members has an exemplary record on human rights, but each has a vital role to play in stabilizing Afghanistan, and all share Washington's goals of promoting economic development and containing terrorism, extremism, and narcotics trafficking. The concept of Greater Central Asia rightly stresses the interconnected nature of the region in terms of transportation, energy, electricity, and water, as well as terrorism, and so a policy of engagement and cooperation makes strategic sense. Washington's policy toward this remote but critical region has evolved, and its diplomatic and military bureaucracies have become more sophisticated in their approach. And yet the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an institution remains marginal to Washington's calculations.
